How Can We Measure the State of the Peace Movement?

June 10, 2003

One of the prob­lems with the peace move­ment is that it rarely mea­sures itself. There are few met­rics that point to the effec­tive­ness of our work. There are a cou­ple of rea­sons for this:

  • It’s hard to mea­sure, often our sucess­es will be invisible;
  • Mea­sur­ing might show donors that favorite orga­ni­za­tions aren’t that influential;
  • We might real­ize we need to re-vision our work to speak to today’s con­di­tions rather than con­tin­u­al­ly try to re-create a “gold­en age” of peace move­ments past;
  • We might have to real­ly broad­en our coali­tions and invite new orga­ni­za­tions in.

Each peace move­ment group is an enti­ty unto itself. But they are also all parts of net­works with oth­er groups. Some­times these net­works are giv­en names and mem­ber­ship is for­mal­ly list­ed. But more often the net­works are infor­mal asso­ci­a­tions of like-minded orga­ni­za­tions who have shared his­to­ry, staff and past move­ment orga­niz­ing together.

The friend­ships behind these infor­mal alliances can often be a strength to over­worked staff peo­ple who can eas­i­ly feel dis­cour­aged. But it also means they all turn to each oth­er too much, and an effect which the mil­i­tary calls “incen­tu­ous ampli­fi­ca­tion” can occur. The heads of estab­lished peace groups will all talk only to the heads of oth­er peace groups to affirm each other’s impor­tance. Mean­while new groups are locked out of this bud­dy system.

Luck­i­ly the inter­net has giv­en us a way to mea­sure these net­works. If each estab­lished peace group is thought of as a “node,” then its impor­tance is a reflec­tion of it’s con­nec­tions to oth­er net­works and to oth­er nodes. Web search engines can mea­sure how many links each organization’s has with oth­er organizations.

Here at the Non­vi­o­lence Web, we pre­fer to use Altavista for this mea­sure­ment. A properly-constructed search query on Altavista will return the num­ber of links to the site’s home­page and to all of it’s sub-pages while not includ­ing the site’s own links to itself. Here’s the search string:

link:www.domain.org ‑url:www.domain.org

The num­bers reflect just how wide­ly our orga­ni­za­tions are linked to oth­er orga­ni­za­tions and where we fit in the larg­er net­works. Here’s how I’ve trans­lat­ed it for peace move­ment groups:

  • Under 100 links: unknown group, prob­a­bly a sin­gle individual’s pet project;
  • 100 – 500 links: a small group, respect­ed by its lim­it­ed core audi­ence but lit­tle known out­side it;
  • 500‑5000 links: a well-respected group thought of as the most pri­ma­ry source for a par­tic­u­lar type of activism but lit­tle known out­side the estab­lished peace movement;
  • 5,000 – 8,000 links: an impor­tant peace orga­ni­za­tion, well known and respect­ed out­side it’s core community;
  • 8,000 – 15,000 links: a well-known group even out­side the peace move­ment, one wide­ly rec­og­nized as being a hub of information.
  • 15,000 links: a widely-known orga­ni­za­tion such as Amnesty Inter­na­tion­al or Greenpeace.

Know­ing where we all stand acts as a good real­i­ty check for our ambi­tions. Each orga­ni­za­tion is strongest when it knows its core rep­u­ta­tion and bases its future work on a level-headed assess­ment of strengths, oppor­tu­ni­ties and weak­ness­es. We can be vision­ary and strate­gic —- indeed we must be to bring non­vi­o­lence to the world! —- but we must also be sure not to squan­der donors’ money.

One obvi­ous caveat: most peace orga­ni­za­tions don’t focus on the inter­net. A low rank­ing doesn’t mean that their work isn’t impor­tant or use­ful. Inter­net links are only one mea­sure­ment, one that needs to be tak­en in con­text. Still: when an indi­vid­ual or group links to our pages it does rep­re­sent a sort of endorse­ment, a indi­ca­tion that they iden­ti­fy with the work we’re doing. The link­er is telling oth­ers that this is a peace group they think their vis­i­tors should know about. We ignore these endorse­ments at our own folly.

Some Iraq Analysts Felt Pressure From Cheney Visits

June 9, 2003

The Wash­ing­ton Post reports that “senior intel­li­gence offi­cials” at the CIA felt pres­sured Vice Pres­i­dent Dick Cheney’s mul­ti­ple vis­its to CIA head­quar­ters over the past year. These vis­its cre­at­ed “an envi­ron­ment in which some ana­lysts felt they were being pres­sured to make their assess­ments fit with the Bush admin­is­tra­tion’s pol­i­cy objectives.”

War in the Congo

May 31, 2003

Almost total­ly unre­port­ed in the U.S. media, the wars in Cen­tral Africa are get­ting even more bloody. Reports of the most bru­tal mas­sacres are com­ing out of the Con­go’s Ituri province. Make sure to read Sarah Left­’s fact­sheet explain­ing the war. From the UK Guardian, once again one of the few sources of good infor­ma­tion on inter­na­tion­al affairs. There’s also a good intro in June 18th’s Coun­ter­punch What’s Behind the Killing in Cen­tral Africa?.

Who Lied About Weapons of Mass Destruction?

May 31, 2003

It’s time to state the obvi­ous: there weren’t any “weapons of mass destruc­tion” in Iraq. The stat­ed ratio­nale for this war was “sim­ply wrong” (see below). Either U.S. Intel­li­gence agen­cies made the biggest mis­take of the new cen­tu­ry or there’s been sys­tem­at­ic, pre­med­i­tat­ed lying at the high­est lev­els of the U.S. gov­ern­ment. Mid-level intel­li­gence and mil­i­tary com­man­ders are start­ing to duck and weave to avoid the fall­out: U.S. Insid­ers Say Iraq Intel Delib­er­ate­ly Skewed and Did Iraq real­ly have weapons of mass destruc­tion? and Was the Intel­li­gence Cooked?

Pres­i­dent Bush and his insid­ers will sure­ly con­tin­ue to deny the obvi­ous and bul­ly on with more lies and mis­for­ma­tion. Will the Amer­i­can pub­lic stop believ­ing? Or have we entered a phase in Amer­i­can his­to­ry in which the Big Lie can jus­ti­fy out­right impe­ri­al­ism and per­pet­u­al war? Post­ed 5/31/2003

Shouting with Anger and Love for America’s True Greatness

March 19, 2003

The hor­rif­ic events of 9/11 would make any coun­try trem­ble. But with the right lead­er­ship we could have shown the world our steady resolve and courage and we could have cel­e­brat­ed an Amer­i­can love and life and lib­er­ty that no air­plane could destroy. But Pres­i­dent George W. Bush has had uses for ter­ror. For eigh­teen months he has beat­en the drums of revenge till fear has become a sec­ond heart­beat in our pysche. Sim­mer Amer­i­ca over a low flame of fear and spice it with con­tempt for the world and you can bring her and her peo­ple to cry hun­gri­ly for blood [con­tin­ued on defunct Non​vi​o​lence​.org dis­cus­sion board] 

Tough Time to Love War(Making)

January 23, 2003

This just isn’t a good time to be George W. Bush. Unit­ed Nations inspec­tors comb­ing Iraq for weapons of mass destruc­tion have come up emp­ty hand­ed. Sad­dam Hus­sein has allow­ing them rel­a­tive­ly unfet­tered access but all they’ve uncov­ered is a few unused shells.

Bush is noth­ing if not per­sis­tent when it comes to per­ceived world bad guys. Just yes­ter­day he told an audi­ence in St. Louis that Hus­sein is “a dan­ger­ous, dan­ger­ous man with dan­ger­ous, dan­ger­ous weapons.” Despite the repeat­ed use dan­ger­ous, the rest of the world is uncon­vinced. Ger­man Chan­cel­lor Ger­hard Schroder still talks about “peace­ful solu­tions” and Ger­many and France is putting the brakes on war in the U.N. Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil, wait­ing for evi­dence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruc­tion to turn up.

It must frus­trate our pres­i­dent to see that all these years of mil­i­tary sanc­tions against Iraq have been work­ing. All the evi­dence uncov­ered by the U.N. inspec­tors prove that we can “win with­out war,” as one cur­rent slo­gan goes, and that we have in fact been win­ning. We’ve kept Sad­dam Hus­sein from rebuild­ing his mil­i­tary after the Gulf War. U.S. iso­la­tion of Iraq has been suc­cess­ful despite its numer­ous flaws. Sad­dam is not a threat.

Which brings us to real threats and to North Korea. Pres­i­dent Bush and his team of war mon­ger­ers have been so busy look­ing at Iraq that they’ve giv­en North Korea just spo­radic atten­tion. Recently-declassified reports show that the U.S. Cen­tral Intel­li­gence Agency has known much more about North Korea’s nuclear bomb mak­ing over the last dozen years than anyone’s been admitting.

The C.I.A. has known that North Korea and Pak­istan have been trad­ing nuclear secrets. Pak­istan has been show­ing its ally of con­ve­nience how to build the cen­trifuges that process weapons-grade ura­ni­um. North Korea in return has pro­vid­ed the mis­sile tech­nol­o­gy that gives Pak­istan the nuclear reach to destroy arch-rival India. Now that we know Pres­i­dent Bush knew all about this his­to­ry of what we might call “dan­ger­ous, dan­ger­ous” tech­nol­o­gy trade, why did he cozy up to Pak­istan fol­low­ing Sep­tem­ber 11th? He so want­ed wars with Afghanistan and Iraq that he nor­mal­ized rela­tions with a coun­try far more dan­ger­ous. If a Pak­istani or North Kore­an nuclear weapon goes off in New York City it will kill a whole lot more peo­ple than Osama bin Laden’s four hijacked air­planes. What hap­pened on Sep­tem­ber 11th was ter­ri­ble but it’s noth­ing com­pared to what a ene­my with resources could do.

There are real threats to world peace, far more “dan­ger­ous, dan­ger­ous” than Iraq. The Unit­ed States needs to drop its president’s obses­sions and look square­ly at the world and who we’re allied with. And when we reset our poli­cies we wqcan use Iraq as our mod­el. For as the U.N. inspec­tors have proven, we can cre­ate peace through diplo­ma­cy and we can iso­late trou­ble­mak­ers through smart sanctions.

What a tough les­son for U.S. lead­ers bent on war.